



UNSC

Delegate's
Study Guide

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Welcoming Letter

Honorable delegates,

It is our utmost pleasure to welcome you to the United Nations Security Council at the second edition of LazarMUN! Taking into account that both of us participated in last year's edition as delegates, we are very attached to this conference and we couldn't be more excited to have you here! Therefore, it is our hope that you will enjoy it just as much as we do!

We are honoured to have you as a part of what we promise to be an amazing academic experience. We can't wait to see each and every one of you evolve throughout the committee sessions, and grow into your own style of debate and public speaking. We are sure that you will channel your efforts into making the best out of it and live up to what will certainly be a thrillingly complex affair.

You will be given great responsibility, taking into account that you will simulate the activity of a vital organ in the UN. The topic at hand holds great importance, especially considering the latest events, since the new year has started. It is indeed a complex one that shall require in-depth research and consideration. The present document shall be the starting point of your research and in order to fully understand the topic and the position of your country we highly advise you to conduct extensive research on your own. We stand completely at your disposal from this point on until the very end of this conference, therefore, feel free to contact us for any questions you may have. Whatever misunderstandings or impediments might cross you, don't be afraid to ask us for help. We are beyond excited to see your development throughout the conference and grateful for being able to be a part of it as well.

Best of luck,

Ioana Drăgușin & Renée Tudor

Introduction to the United Nations Security Council

The United Nations was founded in 1945¹ as a response to the Second World War, in the hopes that states will have an engine for governments to find common ground and work upon solving pressing issues faced by the international community. The main organs that operate within the UN are the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the UN Secretariat², which were all established when the UN was founded. The United Nations also provides a forum for its 193 Member State to express their views in order to avoid possible conflicts and solve problems together by coming to an agreement.

The Security Council is the most powerful body in the UN, with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security”³, taking the lead in determining the existence of a threat and calling upon its Member States to diplomatically dispute it in order to settle issues by peaceful means, at times recommending methods of adjustment or stating terms of settlement. It is also the only organ that has the executive power in order to dispatch military operations when required, impose sanctions, mandates arms inspections or deploy election monitors.

The Security Council has functioned over the years by the Organization’s Charter⁴, despite attempts to provide changes. It is always made up of 15 members, each Member State having one vote; out of them, there are 5 permanent Member States, the P5 members (the People’s Republic of China, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America), while the other 10 are elected every two years.

The P5 Members are afforded veto power, through which they can instantly prevent a draft resolution from passing. The P5’s privileged status is rooted in the United Nations’ founding. Throughout the years, these states have exercised their veto power to different extents, as Russia has used the veto most frequently, followed by the United States, while, although China has the least vetoes, it has vetoed more resolutions than both France and the UK in recent years.



Members of the United Nations Security Council sat during a meeting

¹ <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/overview/index.html>

² <https://www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html>

³ <https://www.globalpolicy.org/security-council.html>

⁴ <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/introductory-note/index.html>

Topic: The escalation of the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz

Overview of the topic

The Strait of Hormuz is a strait between the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. It provides the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the open ocean and is one of the world's most strategically important choke points. On the north coast lies Iran and on the south coast of the United Arab Emirates and Musandam, an exclave of Oman. The strait is about 90 nautical miles (167 km) long, with a width varying from about 52 nautical miles (96 km) to 21 nautical miles (39 km).


A third of the world's liquefied natural gas and almost 25% of total global oil consumption passes through the strait, making it a highly important strategic location for international trade. As the narrowest point of the Strait of Hormuz is twenty-one nautical miles, all vessels passing through the Strait must traverse the territorial waters of Iran and Oman. The right of passage for foreign vessels under international law will consequently be subject to either the rules of non-suspendable innocent passage or transit passage depending on the applicable legal regime.



Throughout the past decades, The Islamic Republic of Iran has made multiple threats

that it will be blocking both innocent and transit passage in the strait, however it has never actually done so. Closing the Strait of Hormuz would have severe consequences, most notably, making oil prices skyrocket like never before, in an otherwise economically distressed period.⁵

The strategic Strait of Hormuz



Historical background

When discussing how tensions escalated in the Strait of Hormuz we need to take into account all of the factors and previous events that shaped the situation into its current form.

The Strait of Hormuz is no longer than 167 km and 33,8 km wide, yet news headlines have transformed this area into the biggest, most popular waterway, after the latest actions of countries such as The Islamic Republic of Iran, The United States of America or The UK.

Historically, the Persian Gulf has been viewed as an avenue between the East and West, particularly as a land-bridge to Africa-Europe and the Indian ocean. The gulf region, including the strait, is considered vital for communication purposes in the international scene, its importance being mainly derived from its geographical position. Its significance made it a focal point of international tensions between Tehran and the West⁶. The United States of America and Iran have both proven to have the power to change the global economy once and for all with their recent actions; yet, there are many more countries that are involved, whether we are talking about states that export most of their crude oil via the strait (Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia), states that export almost all of their liquefied natural gas via the strait (Qatar), or countries that share territorial rights over the strait (Iran and Oman). The strait of hormuz is vital to the states themselves. States such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have no outlet to the high seas other than the strait, as well as, depending on the large oil revenues, which constitute the backbone of their economy.

In 1959, respectively **1972**, both Iran and Oman attempted to alter the legal status of the strait by expanding their territorial sea by 12 nautical miles. Therefore, since 1972, the Strait of Hormuz was completely “closed” by the combined waters of Iran and Oman.

Although it is regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), Iran has signed, but not ratified, the convention and has historically acted to protect its interests in the region.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, both Iran and Oman made several declarations and claims over the Strait that were found to be inconsistent with the international maritime law. Since September 1980, when Iraq invaded Iran, both countries were caught in a battle for supremacy over the Middle East as Iraq took advantage of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to become the dominant power in the Gulf. In 1984, the battlefield moved to the Strait of Hormuz in what was later known as the Tanker War. Iraq’s goal was targeting Iranian oil tankers as they were exporting an immense amount of oil and petroleum products through the waterway and their economy was, and still is, heavily reliant on the Strait. The United States acted in order to keep the Strait open for transport and intervened in 1987, pursuing a naval intervention whose goal was protecting the oil tankers. As a consequence, this intervention pressured Teheran to seek peace with Iraq and the war ended in 1988.

On the 27th of December 2011, Iran threatened to choke off the flow of oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian threat came in response to a recent tightening of Western sanctions against Iran that attempt to limit the amount of oil that countries can export. "If Iran oil is banned, not a single drop of oil will pass through Hormuz Strait," Iran's


⁶ <https://time.com/5632388/strait-of-hormuz-iran-tanker/>

1st Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi said Tuesday, according to the Iran State News Agency.⁷ In turn, The United States increased its naval presence in the strait, ostensibly in an exercise of its transit rights of passage under the law of the sea.⁸

On the 4th of July 2019, British marines seized an Iranian oil tanker off the coast of Gibraltar after claiming it had violated European Union sanctions by transporting oil to Syria.

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On the 19th of July 2019, Iranian forces using fast boats and helicopters seized the British tanker *Stena Impero* and its crew, including many Indian nationals, in the Strait of Hormuz. The British warship *Montrose* could not arrive in time to stop the nimble capture.¹⁰



Key Terms

strait= a comparatively narrow passageway connecting two large bodies of water

choke point= a strategic route providing passage through or to another region

focal point= the center of interest or activity

high seas=in maritime law, all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding the globe that are not part of the territorial sea or internal waters of a state

territorial sea=the part of territorial waters subject to the jurisdiction of a coastal state usually extending from mean low water mark on the shore or from the seaward limit of a bay or mouth of a river a marine league or 3 geographical miles outward to the open sea

⁷ https://money.cnn.com/2011/12/27/markets/oil_iran/index.htm?hpt=hp_t2

⁸ <https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passage-rights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage>

⁹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/04/royal-marines-gibraltar-tanker-oil-syria-eu-sanctions>

¹⁰ <https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-07-26/iran-hormuz-strait-persian-gulf-history-conflicts>

contiguous zone= a band of water extending farther from the outer edge of the territorial sea to up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline, within which a state can exert limited control for the purpose of preventing or punishing infringement of its customs

innocent passage= term of international law referring to a ship or aircraft's right to enter and pass through another's territory so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the other state

transit passage= a concept of the Law of the Sea which allows a vessel or aircraft the freedom of navigation or overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of a strait between one part of the high seas or exclusive economic zone and another

Legal Framework


The importance of navigation through international straits is fundamental, derived from the global recognition of their role in international trade and the interest of the entire community of nations surrounding it. International straits, such as the strait of Hormuz, serve as the trade routes of seaborne commerce as well as sea lines for military vessels.

Since most nations have claimed a 3 mile territorial sea, the legal regime of almost all the important international straits was not affected because most of them were beyond that limit.

However, with the expansion of the territorial sea since World War II, the fear of restriction and control of navigation through straits has been felt throughout the user states, particularly the maritime powers.

In an attempt to resolve the issue, multilateral conventions started being held. The U.N. Convention held in Geneva in 1958 produced the **Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone**¹¹. However, neither the right of innocent passage, nor the criteria or prohibition of innocent passage were precisely defined.

A crucial dispute inside of this Convention was in regards to **article 16**¹², more precisely, the third and fourth subclauses, which state: **16.3**: “Subject to the provisions of



SOURCE: AL JAZEERA, MARINE TRACKER, TANKER TRACKERS, REUTERS
UPDATED: JULY 5, 2018

@AJLabs ALJAZEERA

¹¹ <https://legal.un.org/avl/ha/gclos/gclos.html>

¹² https://www.gc.noaa.gov/documents/8_1_1958_territorial_sea.pdf

paragraph 4, the coastal State may, without discrimination amongst foreign ships, suspend temporarily in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security. Such suspension shall take effect only after having been duly published.” ; **16.4**: “There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships through straits, which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State.” Because of the important implication of the strategic and political interests of the strait, the Iranian delegate voted *against* Article 16.4, claiming that a right of innocent passage, as opposed to non-suspendable passage, would be the only regime applicable to the Strait of Hormuz, trying to put emphasis on article 16.3 which entitles a coastal state to suspend temporary foreign ships passing through its territorial sea.¹³ Similarly, due to its national security, Oman maintained that the regime of innocent passage should prevail within a strait as well as within a territorial sea, but claimed that article 16.4 *did not apply* to the Strait of Hormuz, under the pretext that the regime of the strait is that of proper territorial sea. It also insisted on requiring prior authorization for particular types of foreign vessels. Saudi Arabia also *strongly objected* to the particular right of passage through straits as described by Article 16.4, when voting on said article, further abstaining mainly due to the paragraph, which the delegation believed was designed to serve a unique case (stating: “Saudi Arabia would take the necessary steps to protect its national interests against the interpretation and application of paragraph 4”).

Generally speaking, all the coastal states of the Gulf, except Iran and Oman, advocated the **principle of free passage** through straits used for international navigation which connect two parts of the high seas. Their views are that any proposed rules should distinguish between those straits which connect two high seas and have been customarily used for international navigation and those straits which only connect the high sea to the territorial sea of a foreign state. Free passage should be guaranteed for the former, while the innocent passage regime should apply to the latter. Furthermore, they advocate the **principle of free transit** through international straits providing such straits connect two parts of high seas and have been customarily used for international navigation.

The Third UN Conference adopted a new Law of the Sea Convention (**the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea**¹⁴). It provides, among other things, a 12 mile territorial sea and codifies a transit passage regime in international straits as well as innocent passage through territorial sea¹⁵. Although the 1982 Convention has not escaped critical commentary, especially those provisions relating to the transit passage regime, the navigational articles are still widely believed to provide a minimal satisfactory balance between the interests of commercial and military navigation on the one hand, and the interests of straits States in safeguarding their security and resources on the other.

¹³

https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI-1&chapter=21#EndDec

¹⁴ https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

¹⁵ https://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm

In the case of the Strait of Hormuz, both Iran and Oman have claimed 12 miles territorial seas in their municipal laws before the 1982 Convention codified the limit. The extension of territorial seas to 12 miles would mean that the Strait of Hormuz has lost its central belt of high sea. In addition, since both Iran and Oman have not ratified or acceded to the 1958 Geneva Convention and there is no specific international agreement governing passage through the Strait, thusly, determining the question of how the regime of passage would apply to the Strait of Hormuz.

Current Situation and Major Issues

Competition between the major powers, in seeking influence and presence in the region has led to speculation that this struggle might be transformed into an active threat to the Gulf region. Several factors, both external and regional, have contributed to the instability and volatility of the region.

In addition, various kinds of threats have emerged from within the region. In the last several decades there has been friction between the gulf states. The instability and volatility of the region contributed to the tensions, the most significant threat to stability being related to unresolved maritime and land boundaries (territorial disputes such as: Iran and the United Arab Emirates over the islands of Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tunbs, the Iraq-Kuwait boundary conflict or the Iraq-Iran conflict over the Shah-Al Arab waterway)The vulnerability of the Gulf Sea lanes as a result of illegal military activities has raised serious concern about the maintenance of the Strait's security. The problems of unresolved territorial disputes as well as the Iranian claim to some strategic islands at the entrance to the Strait have highlighted the challenges to the strategic region. Any cessation of international shipping from the Gulf region, by any means of threats, could destabilize the economies of the oil importing as well as the exporting states. Such an action would, in fact, threaten the entire international community.

In recent years, the U.S. and Iranian navies have had numerous tense encounters in the Persian Gulf. An intentional or inadvertent incident at sea could quickly escalate into a direct military confrontation, and risk shipping through the critical energy chokepoint. Especially considering one of the most recent developments that sparked fear internationally, the assassination of the head of the IRGC's Qods force, Qasem Soleimani, who was killed, "at the direction of the President," in a US strike in Baghdad, on the 2nd of January 2020

That being said, there is much fear that the political stability of the Gulf States and the maintenance of the Strait's security might be threatened. The Gulf Sea lanes are not only unguarded but their safety is shrouded in ambiguity. that "enemies should bear in mind that the Islamic Republic of Iran will take tough revenge on criminals over the martyrdom of General Soleimani".

Stance of Main Actors

Islamic Republic of Iran

Iran has exercised its sovereignty over its territorial sea up to the limit since 1958. In 1959 Iran extended its territorial sea up to 12 miles. Even though the extension of the Iranian territorial sea to that limit was primarily due to its economic and security interests, as it would not affect the legal status of the strait, since, at that time, Oman had not extended its territorial sea to 12 miles yet. If Iran were to carry out its threat of blocking the passage of oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz in response to Western economic sanctions, this would amount to a violation of international law by interfering with the rights of transit passage under UNCLOS as well the rights of non-suspendable innocent passage under the 1958 Geneva Convention. The state's constant attempts to not be required to grant innocent passage at any given time shows where its interests lie for the future.

The Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) provided a tangible illustration of the seriousness of threats to the sea lanes and their potential importance in any future conflict, and the control that Iran has over the strait. The gulf war showed the many possible forms of restricting international shipping. The question of protection of freedom was highlighted during the war, just like the safety of international traffic was a subject of concern when Iran threatened to close the strait and announced how it could easily shut it. Prior to the war, Iran and Oman were responsible for protecting the Strait of Hormuz and the sea lanes. In the mid 1970s , they agreed on the joint defence of the navigable sea lanes in the strait. At the third conference on the Law of the Sea, Iran supported the concept of a "semi-enclosed sea", a concept which would have involved naval supervision by Iran as a military protector of the gulf, but due to suspicions concerning the intent of Iran's maritime policy, and its ongoing attempts to control the Gulf area, including the strait, the proposal was not supported by any of the other gulf states.

Over the last few years, the US has accused Iran of attacking and harassing commercial shipping vessels on the waterway, as well as shooting down a US drone over the Persian Gulf¹⁶, only to receive as a response the British marines seizing an Iranian oil tanker (July 4th), after which Iran also decided to the British tanker Stena Impero and its crew (July 19th). The game of cat and mouse between the United States of America and Iran has awakened fear within people all over the world, raising concerns that the tensions could even lead to a military conflict.

In recent years, visits to Iran by Russian and Chinese naval representatives have stepped up, running up to the three states joining together in making trilateral maritime exercises, in seeking to promote regional security and boost military cooperation with Beijing and Moscow amid the unprecedented economic sanctions from the US. This drill is seen as a

¹⁶ <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-07-19/iran-strait-of-hormuz-oil-tanker-seizure>

response to the US's recent maneuvers of allying with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where it has also sent a number of additional missile defense systems¹⁷.

United States of America

As a result of killing top Iranian general Qassem Soleimani by the US airstrike in Baghdad, Iran has stated that the United States has committed a “grave mistake”, for which it has also vowed “revenge”. But, moreover, the oil prices have managed to skyrocket for the past days due to tensions growing bigger and bigger.

Tensions have been brewing between the U.S. and Iran since Iran's Islamic Revolution four decades ago, but the situation reached a boiling point last month after the U.S. claimed an increased threat from Iran, a year after pulling out of a multi-nation nuclear treaty with Tehran.

In the Iran-Iraq war, the United States acted in order to keep the Strait open for transport and intervened in 1987, pursuing a naval intervention whose goal was protecting the oil tankers. As a consequence, this intervention pressured Teheran to seek peace with Iraq, ending the war in 1988. The situation became even more delicate when a month before the war was over, a U.S. warship shot down an Iranian airliner over the Strait of Hormuz, causing 290 deaths. The board of the American ship, Vincennes, had mistakenly identified the Iranian Flight 655, an Airbus 300, as a F-14 fighter jet that could have attacked the ship. The U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, dispatched a five-paragraph note to Iran expressing “deep regret” over the incident.

The current tensions between the US and Iran are considered to have started as a retaliation, as a consequence for the US and European sanctions towards Iranian oil revenue, which were meant to deter Teheran's pursuit of its nuclear program. Ever since US President Donald Trump took office¹⁸, the sanctions on Iran have been on the rise, driving Iran to, once again, issue threats of closing the strait.

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

The British vision on the Iranian proclama of extending their territorial waters to 12 nautical miles is that they “could not recognize unilateral claims to a breadth of territorial sea greater than three miles as valid under international law”, but Iran motivated their claim by saying the territory is essential for security.

Following the release of a British tanker from Iran, the government of UK has chosen to lower its security risk level for UK-flagged ships travelling through the Strait. The decision was made on the 7th of November 2019. The Stena Impero was seized in July 2019 by Iran's Revolutionary Guards in the Strait, a major oil shipping route, for alleged marine violations two weeks after Britain detained an Iranian tanker off Gibraltar. The Iranian ship

¹⁷

<https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/12/25/iran-to-conduct-naval-drills-with-china-and-russia/>

¹⁸ <https://time.com/5632388/strait-of-hormuz-iran-tanker/>

was released in August. Iran accused the vessel of colliding with a fishing boat and failing to respond to calls, but the ship's owners said there was no evidence. The UK said it deployed a Royal Navy frigate to come to the tanker's aid and warned Iranian authorities that their actions were illegal, but the frigate was unable to reach the scene in time.¹⁹

After the US's fatal drone strike on Iran's top general Qasen Soleimani, the Royal Navy will accompany ships through the Strait of Hormuz with the aim of soaring tension in the Middle East.

The last imminent move to protect UK-flagged ships came in December 2019 as the Foreign Office was strengthening its travel warnings across the region as fears of all-out war heightened.

How it happened: Stena Impero's route through the Strait of Hormuz



Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

The Saudi Government suffered two separate attacks on oil tankers in May and June of 2019 just outside of Hormuz.²⁰ Although it wasn't proven that Iran was at fault, whether purposely or accidentally, both the US and Saudi Arabia speculated so. Being the biggest shipper of crude oil through the strait the fears that its exports are vulnerable to Iranian interference have become more of a reality. Consequently, Saudi Arabia publicly joined a US-led maritime security operation in the Persian Gulf days after the attack on their oil production facilities.²¹ Since then, it has been defending its decision to the public, a defense ministry official stating; "The kingdom's accession to this international alliance comes in support of regional and international efforts to deter and counter threats to maritime navigation and global trade"

Unlike other states in the region, Saudi Arabia (as well as the UAE) also have a coastline on another sea. In this case, the Red Sea, the country's western boundary, which

¹⁹

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-iran-tanker-britain/uk-lowers-security-level-for-its-ships-in-strait-of-hormuz-idUSKBN1XH1PX>

²⁰

<https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-28/saudi-arabia-plan-to-avoid-oil-danger-at-hormuz-isn-t-much-safer>

²¹

<https://www.dw.com/en/saudi-arabia-joins-us-maritime-operation-in-persian-gulf-after-oil-attacks/a-50469817>

showcases an imperfect but viable alternative in the case that the state needs to stop shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

United Arab Emirates

In an instance similarly as bizarre as the events that occurred to the Saudi oil tankers, in July of 2019, an oil tanker travelling through the Strait of Hormuz stopped transmitting its location after it had just drifted into Iranian waters²². Although nothing has been proven in this instance either, it has clearly accentuated already existing suspicions and heightened tensions between Iran and several Middle-Eastern and Western nations.

In the following months, the UAE also joined the US-led maritime coalition, alongside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia aimed at protecting international shipping in and near the strait, following the alleged Iranian attacks on both states' oil tankers.

Republic of India

Although it may not seem so, India is the state that is being affected the most by the recurring tensions in the Strait of Hormuz. Two-thirds of the oil and half the liquefied natural gas (LNG) India imports come from the strait between Iran and Oman.

In the face of US-Iran conflict around the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices have been rising. Almost 84% of India's crude oil imports move through the Strait of Hormuz and India has great concerns as any price hike or disturbances in supply will prove to be costly and damaging to the country.²³

Points to Be Addressed

How should military actions and development be regulated in this area?

Considering tensions as of 2020 between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran, how would the impending conflict affect the Strait of Hormuz?

What are the effects that the ongoing tensions have had on the oil industry both internationally and regionally?

What measures can be taken at an international scale in order to protect the strait?

What measures can the UNSC take in order to minimize tensions?

²² <https://www.foxnews.com/world/uae-oil-tanker-strait-of-hormuz-iran-waters>

²³

<https://medium.com/policy-lab/us-iran-conflict-in-the-strait-of-hormuz-and-its-impact-on-india-2de2ce33ef4a>

How can the Security Council influence settlements of possible conflicts?

Were the territorial rights abused by the Member States that owned them?

Further Reading and Other Relevant Documents

1) Videos briefly explaining the situation

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JLv19uO6C5o>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ifdp3B4yh1w>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZOH-XIqciA>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PzVciyf5iXU>

2) Thoroughly further explains the situation and showcases a timeline of recent developments

<https://www.crisisgroup.org/trigger-list/iran-us-trigger-list/flashpoints/hormuz>

3) Clarifying freedom of navigation in the gulf

<https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/clarifying-freedom-of-navigation-in-the-gulf>

4) Further explaining the US- Iran conflict involving the strait

<https://www.vox.com/videos/2019/8/22/20828858/us-iran-hormuz-oil-tanker>

5) The US- Iran conflict

<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-usa/iran-threatens-u-s-navy-as-sanctions-hit-economy-idUSTRE80208P20120103>

6) Further discussing Iran's threats of closing the strait

<https://www.euronews.com/2019/06/28/strait-of-hormuz-why-does-iran-threaten-to-close-it>

7) Recent article regarding the US- Iran conflict

<https://globalnews.ca/news/6365846/iran-retaliation-strait-of-hormuz/>