



DISEC

Delegate's
Study Guide

Welcoming Letter

Distinguished delegates,

It is a tremendous pleasure to welcome you to the second edition of LazarMUN, a conference we expect to be both deeply academically enriching, as well as an exciting and dynamic environment for you to meet people and debate topics with great impact on the world we live in. With that being said, we assure you that everybody involved in this conference has dedicated themselves and has put in an insane amount of work in order to make sure that it turns out to be a conference like no previous one. We hope it will surprise you and challenge you, while still being a fun, thrilling experience.

As your chairpersons of the DISEC committee (Disarmament and International Security Committee), we are eager to coordinate your activity and witness how everything will unravel. We encourage you to engage in the activity of the committee as much as you can, since the benefits that you will gain from this conference are proportional to how involved you will be. This study guide is aimed to provide you the basic information regarding each topic, but we trust you to dive deeper into your own research. Respecting your country's policy is the most important concern you must always keep in mind, especially when conducting your research, but, equally important, during the conference.

Once the MUN begins, we advise you to speak as much as you can, while also focusing on the quality of your speeches. We suggest you actively listen to what the other delegates have to say, in order to make intelligent compromises and valuable statements. Whether you are a first timer or an experienced delegate, we hope you will come with an open mind and will to always improve.

If you have any type of uncertainties or need any help or clarifications, we are here to provide everything you need and help you both prior to the conference, as well as all throughout it.

Kindest regards,

Matei Constantinescu, Vlad Pangratie

Overview of the topic


Ever since the beginning of the 20th century, the Middle East has constantly been affected by different military conflicts. All of them have a common denominator: violence. With the rising scale of these tensions, the international community mobilized itself in order to help remedy the situation. After several discussions within United Nations meetings, it was decided that one of the best ways of aiding the situation was the establishment of a Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ).

In such a conflict-ridden area with a history of mistrust and animosity where weapons of mass destruction were used in the past, the prospect of renewed WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) use is a threatening possibility. For these reasons, a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is a matter of practical urgency.

In the past, nuclear-weapon-free zones have been viewed as an effective way to perform a variety of disarmament and nonproliferation tasks. They have proved to be effective in enabling states in a region to take the initiative to exclude nuclear weapons from their territories, to establish greater transparency and verification measures, to prevent nuclear weapons tests from being conducted in the certain region, to bolster confidence among the countries of the certain region because their neighbours are not engaged in nuclear weapons activities, to create and maintain nonproliferation norms, and to promote broader regional cooperation, including but not limited to the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although treaties have been successful in accomplishing these objectives, their full potential has not always been realized due to a number of barriers within and external to the region.

Currently, there are six nuclear-free zones worldwide: in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific. So far, they have all met their purpose, creating stability in their respective region and provide a means for countries to work together on common regional security.

A future WMDFZ requires of parties not to own, acquire, test, produce or use any nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as their delivery systems, in conformity with the 1995 NPT Review Conference Middle East resolution. A shared understanding would also prove beneficial in order to categorize the types of delivery systems that would become subject to the prohibitions under the zone.



Historical Background :

At the 2010 **NPT** (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) Review Conference, state parties were able to agree to five practical steps to make progress towards implementing the 1995 NPT Review Conference Middle East resolution. The United States, Russia and the United Kingdom, the treaty depository powers and sponsors of that Resolution, committed to working together with the UN Secretary General to convene a regional conference to discuss the issue in 2012. Other measures agreed included the appointment of a **WMDFZ** (Weapon of Mass Destruction Free Zone) facilitator as well as the designation of a government that will host the conference.

The European Union has also offered to host a seminar, a follow-up on the one organized in Paris in 2008, to discuss steps that would facilitate work on establishing the Free Zone ahead of 2012 Conference.

In November 2011, a two-day meeting was held at the **IAEA** (International Atomic Energy Agency) headquarters. The reason for it was to continue working towards the establishment of a **NWFZ** (Nuclear Weapons Free Zone) in the Middle East, to consider declarations of good intentions as a first step to break the current stalemate, to make the best and

most constructive use of every opportunity on the international agenda, and to identify specific and practical confidence-building measures.

The regional conference tasked with the establishment of a **WMD** (weapon of mass destruction) free zone in the Middle East was scheduled to be held in Finland on December 2012, and Finnish Undersecretary of State Jaakko Laajava was named as the facilitator.

On November 23, the United States issued a statement in order to postpone the December 2012 conference. The conference has not yet been rescheduled and the co-conveners are offering different opinions as to when it should be held, and the reasons for the delay. The U.S. statement cited "present conditions in the Middle East" and the lack of agreement by participating states on "acceptable conditions" for the December conference. In a November 24 statement, Russia called for the conference to be held before April 2013, citing that the preparations had already reached an "advanced stage" and that the reason for the postponement was that not all states in the region agreed to participate in the conference (at the time of the announcement, conference facilitator Jaakko Laajava, had not yet secured Israel's attendance). While Iran announced that it would attend on November 7, it also said it would not engage with the Israelis at the conference, and some experts believe Iran only announced it would attend because Tehran knew that the December 2012 meeting would not take place.

On April 29, 2013, Egypt walked out of the NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting in Geneva in protest of the conference's postponement and called for it to be rescheduled as soon as possible.

Between October 2013 and June 2014, Laajava, with the support of the conveners, has held five consultations with the countries in the region aimed at reaching consensus on an agenda for the conference. The last consultation was held in June 2014. The Arab League member states and Israel have attended every meeting. Iran was present only at the first consultation in October 2013 but is regularly briefed on the outcomes of the consultations.

During the 2015 NPT Review Conference, Egypt led the Arab League in pushing a new proposal to dispense with the facilitator and three of the conveners (Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), leaving the UN Secretary General as the sole authority for holding the conference within 180 days of the Review Conference ending. The Egyptian proposal also called for the creation of two working groups. Working Group I would deal with the scope, geographic demarcation, prohibitions and interim measures. Working Group II would deal with verification measures and implementation mechanisms.

A modified version of the Egyptian proposal appeared in the draft final document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The draft final document called for the UN secretary-general to convene a conference by March 1, 2016, aimed at “launching a continuous process of negotiating and concluding a legally binding treaty” that establishes a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

The document called for the secretary-general to appoint by July 1 a special representative to facilitate the process. The facilitator would work with the secretary-general, as well as Russia, the UK, and the United States, to consult with the states in the region on the agenda for the conference.

Under the language in the draft document, if an agenda for the conference were agreed before the March deadline, the secretary-general would have to convene the conference within 45 days of agreement on the agenda.

The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada decided not to support the draft final document from the NPT review conference based on the language concerning the Middle East WMD-free zone. The United States, speaking at the conference, said it objected because the plan to set an agenda and hold a conference was not based on "consensus and equality," and that the document proposed "unworkable conditions" and "arbitrary deadlines."

The WMD-free zone in the Middle East initiative continued to be a key discussion topic at the first NPT preparatory committee meeting in 2017 leading up to the 2020 Review Conference. The Arab League did not present a unified statement on the issue, marking a growing divide among members on the subject. Instead, Egypt, Iran, and a group of 12 Arab League members, including Iraq and the United Arab Emirates, each offered [separate working papers](#) on advancing the WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

In 2018, the UN First Committee adopted a [resolution](#) introduced by Egypt on behalf of the Arab League for the UN secretary-general to convene a conference on taking forward a WMD-free zone in the Middle East in 2019 and every year thereafter until a zone is achieved. Israel, Micronesia and the United States voted against the resolution and 71 countries abstained.

Chronological order of important dates:

1974 – The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approves resolution endorsing the goal of establishing a NWFZ in the Middle East following a proposal by Iran;

1980 - Israel joins international consensus allowing the General Assembly to pass a resolution supporting the goal of NWFZ without a vote;

1989 - The IAEA Secretariat issues report titled “A Technical Study on Different Modalities of Application of Safeguards in the Middle East.”

1990 - The Egyptian proposal to establish an expanded WMDFZ in the Middle East is first submitted before the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva;

1991 – The UN Secretary General releases a “Study on Effective and Verifiable Measures which Would facilitate the Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East” outlining, amongst other things, a number of confidence-building steps that could contribute to the establishment of the zone;

1991 – The IAEA General Conference passes resolution on “the Application of IAEA safeguards in the Middle East” as a necessary step towards the establishment of a NWFZ in the region. The resolution has since been passed annually without objections;

1991 – The UN Security Council Resolution 687 endorses the goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East;

1992 – Discussions on regional arms control begin under the aegis of the Arms Control and Regional Security Group (ACRS), a multilateral regional body born out of the Madrid Middle East peace talks. Envisaged to include discussions on a future WMDFZ, talks were placed indefinitely on hold following a disagreement between Israel and Egypt over the agenda for discussing WMDFZ related issues. Iran and Iraq were not party to these talks;

1995 - The NPT Review Conference adopts a Resolution on the Middle East calling on states to take practical steps to make progress in the establishment of WMDFZ in the region. Member agreement on the resolution was seen as key to securing the indefinite extension of the NPT;

2000 - The NPT Review conference reaffirms the goal of 1995 Middle East Resolution and says that the resolution remains “valid until its goals and objectives are achieved.”

2006 – The WMD Commission Final Report calls for an intensification of international efforts to establish a WMDFZ in the Middle East;

2010 - The NPT Review Conference endorses five practical steps to make progress towards the goal of establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East. Action steps adopted include convening a regional conference to discuss the issue in 2012 and appointing a WMDFZ Facilitator;

2011 - Two-day meeting held at IAEA headquarters on a WMDFZ in the Middle East;

2012 - The conference on the establishment of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is postponed due to a lack of consensus on the agenda;

October 2013–June 2014 - Five consultations are held for the states in the region to discuss moving forward on establishing an agenda for the conference;

May 2015 - The draft final document of the 2015 NPT Review Conference presented a new plan for moving forward on a conference to establish the zone. The United States, the United Kingdom and Canada objected to the document based on these provisions, thus preventing consensus and the adoption of the final document;

Key Terms :

Weapon of Mass Destruction: A weapon of mass destruction is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, or any other weapon that can kill and bring significant harm to numerous humans or cause great damage to human-made structures, natural structures, or the biosphere.

Nuclear weapon: is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission (fission bomb) or from a combination of fission and fusion reactions;

Non-proliferation: the prevention of an increase or spread of something, especially the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Facilitator: A facilitator is someone who engages in facilitation—any activity that makes a social process easy or easier;

Convener: a person whose job is to call people together for meetings of a committee;


Proxy conflict: armed conflict between two states or non-state actors which act on the instigation or on behalf of other parties that are not directly involved in the hostilities;

Civil war: a war between organized groups within the same state or country;

Coup d'etat: the overthrow of an existing government by non-democratic means; typically, it is an illegal, unconstitutional seizure of power by a dictator, the military, a political faction etc;

Legal Framework :

The **Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)** is an international treaty aimed at regulating Nuclear weapons by slowing the rate of how fast they spread and slow down weapon technology. The Treaty was negotiated between 1965 - 1968 by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva Switzerland. The treaty entered into force in 1970. NPT Parties met in May 1995 and agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely. More countries have adhered to the NPT than any other arms limitation and disarmament agreement, a testament to the treaty's significance. Unfortunately, the treaty is not legally enforced by any governing body and progress is still slow.



Participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

■	Recognized nuclear-weapon state ratifiers	■	Acceder which announced its withdrawal (North Korea)
■	Recognized nuclear-weapon acceders	■	Non-signatories (India, Israel, Pakistan, South Sudan)
■	Other ratifiers	■	Partially recognized state which
■	Other acceders or succeeders	■	ratified (Taiwan)

[The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action](#), commonly known as the Iran Nuclear Deal is an agreement on the Iranian nuclear program reached in Vienna on July 14 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States—plus Germany) together with the European Union. Formal negotiations toward **JCPOA** (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) began with the adoption of the [Joint Plan of Action](#), an interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries in November 2013. Iran and the P5+1 countries engaged in negotiations for the next 20 months and in April 2015 agreed on a [framework](#) for the final agreement. In July 2015 Iran and the P5+1 confirmed the agreement on the plan along with the "Roadmap Agreement" between Iran and the IAEA.

[The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons \(TPNW\)](#) prohibits States Parties from developing, testing, producing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing, or stockpiling nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Signatories are barred from transferring or receiving nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, control over such weapons, or any assistance with activities prohibited under the Treaty. States are also prohibited from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Lastly, States Parties cannot allow the stationing, installation, or deployment of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices in their territory. In addition to the Treaty's prohibitions, States Parties are obligated to provide victim assistance and help with environmental remediation efforts.

[Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons](#) (Chemical Weapons Convention) requires States Parties not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons (CW), or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; not to use chemical weapons; not to engage in military preparations for use of chemical weapons; not to assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the convention.

Current situation

The Middle East goes from bad to worse when it comes to conflict in any form. Although Iran is well known for developing a nuclear program due to the media coverage of this, it is not the only country in the Middle East that is suspected to have nuclear capabilities. In a region that has been cursed by many armed conflicts, violence and mass destruction, there are many risks to take into account when we can imagine the Middle East with all nations having nuclear capabilities.

Generally, most, if not all nations, agree upon the general principle that there should be a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in the Middle East. The problem lies beneath the modality of implementing it. A major difference in the countries' vision in regards to the topic is the following question: "Who is at fault for not having a NWFZ already in the region?"

In order to understand how nuclear power can be used, one must make a clear difference between military nuclear programs and civilian nuclear programs. Iran supposedly suspended its military nuclear program but not the civilian one.

There are a few similarities between the two. The first one is the materials required. Virtually all commercial reactors generate energy by burning either enriched uranium or plutonium (two of the easiest materials used for building the core of a nuclear weapon) in light water reactors. Moreover, the most important similarity is the type of expertise required as both of them require similar skills in computer programming, metallurgy, materials and so on.

However, the biggest difference between military nuclear programs and civilian nuclear programs is intent. While for the nuclear weapons the desired end product is nuclear weapons that are classified as a Weapon of Mass Destruction(WMD), the civilian nuclear program focuses on fulfilling the soaring domestic energy demands and reduce their dependence on fossil fuels.



Green- Iran

Blue - United Arab Emirates

Red- Saudi Arabia

There are other countries that are planning to develop civilian nuclear programs in the near future: Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The UAE's first civilian nuclear power plant is currently being built and it is expected to be operating starting this year, Turkey is closely working with the Russian Federation to open a nuclear plant in 2023 and Saudi Arabia pursues an ambitious plan to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2040.

Nuclear energy might be a good solution that would solve the region's increased demand for energy but it needs to be developed within strict international safety standards in order to avoid another nuclear disaster such as Chernobyl, Fukushima or Three Mile Island.

Moreover, some states claim that they plan to use civilian nuclear plants in order to cut their greenhouse gas emissions. France manages to fulfil 75% of the entire country's energy consumption from power plants and it has been this way for years. Unfortunately, France is the exception from the rule and it is mainly because of the Paris' strong nuclear initiatives and an excellent political approach.

The downside of nuclear power plants is waste because the fuel itself is toxic and it needs to be stored underground for thousands of years. Out of all the uranium used for generating energy, only 4% is converted into energy, while the rest is left behind as waste. There are currently 3 main options when it comes to nuclear waste storage: onsite storage, long term storage and reprocessing fuel for use in other nuclear energy plants.

According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, a serious consequence of reprocessing fuel spent could be the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The by-product that is obtained by recycling nuclear fuel is plutonium, which can easily be used to build weapons. In addition to that, only a small part of the reprocessed waste can be used again, therefore, it still produces waste.

However, there is another side of the coin. In the past 10 years, tensions in the Middle East impeded the regional stability with conflicts such as civil wars in Syria, Iraq and Yemen, as well as the conflict between Israel and Palestine. As all the aforementioned countries are all either aligned or militarily supporting at least one of the conflicts in the Middle East and, as previously mentioned, the materials and the expertise needed to build a nuclear weapon are very similar, the good intentions of polluting less might actually become a nuclear war.

Nuclear programs have had a long history in the Middle East dating back to Israel's secret nuclear program in the late 1950s. Back then, the risk of being the only country in the region to have nuclear weapons has determined other countries such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Iran to also pursue the creation of nuclear weapons.

All of these programs were eventually dismantled through international diplomacy ([in the case of Libya](#)) or destroyed by Israel ([Iraq- 7 June 1981](#), [Syria- 6 September 2007](#)), except for Iran's. Due to increased global pressure, especially coming from the Obama Administration, the Iran Nuclear Deal was reached in Vienna on July 14 2015, between Iran and the P5+1 members, which has limited Iran's nuclear capabilities. However, Donald Trump withdrew the United States from this agreement and it is uncertain whether Iran will resume its plans to build the bomb or stick with the deal with the other 5 countries.

As more states pursue nuclear programs, other states could only see that as a threat to their national security which can lead to the creation of even more nuclear programs. This leads to having to solve two problems.

The first is the increasing difficulty of conducting thorough check-ups and inspections because a large number of power plants means there should be more people involved in check-ups in order to verify that the regulations are being respected. If the situation regarding

Iran's intentions were unclear even when the US was part of the deal, multiple countries having the same nuclear capabilities as Iran lead to multiple deals and a lot of time spent in negotiations which may lead to the impossibility of reaching a deal.

The second problem is that, in lack of a NWFZ, a snowball effect might be created as it has happened after the 1950s when the accusation of Israel pursuing a military nuclear program occurred, countries such as Syria, Iraq, Iran and Libya had the intention of pursuing their own.

The stance of main actors

CHINA

China has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 and it is one of the 5 officially-recognised nuclear weapon states, among France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Beijing has always advocated for advancing the Middle East peace process and actively supported the efforts to establish a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

The People's Republic of China fully supports the multilateral efforts in order to achieve peace in the Middle East by actively working with both Palestine and Israel, has voted for all the resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East adopted by the General Assembly every year since 1974. China believes that the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is of great importance and should be implemented effectively and earnestly at an early date.

Their vision on the fact that Israel did not ratify the NPT yet is that it should be ratified by all member states in order to promote the universality of the treaty. Another suggestion is placing all Israeli nuclear facilities under the comprehensive safeguards of IAEA. The Chinese perspective over the situation in Iran is that it should be solved in a more peaceful manner and it strongly suggests that all member states actively pursue a long-term, comprehensive and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue through diplomacy.

FRANCE

France is, as well as China, one of the 5 nuclear states and has ratified the NPT in 1992. It is estimated that the country maintains the third nuclear arsenal in the world, having approximately 300 warheads.

France has acted as one of the good examples when it comes to the nuclear policy as they manage to provide 3 quarters of the national energy needs from nuclear power plants and has built a reputation for this matter.

However, things aren't all nice and clean for Paris. There have been allegations that France, the US and the UK were among the countries that provided nuclear expertise and materials to countries such as Syria and Israel in order to help them build their own nuclear power plants, even though Israel's nuclear capabilities have not been confirmed to this current day.

When Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, France proposed Israel attack Egypt and invade the Sinai as a pretext for France and Britain to invade Egypt posing as "peacekeepers" with the true intent of seizing the Suez Canal. In exchange, France would provide the nuclear reactor as the basis for the Israeli nuclear weapons program.

Moreover, France has signed many resolutions and treaties that sustain the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East and they have vowed to use their nuclear weapons "in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence".

THE UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom maintains an arsenal of 215 nuclear weapons and has reduced its deployed strategic warheads to 120, which are fielded solely by its Vanguard-class submarines under its maritime-only deterrence strategy. The UK is actively reducing its nuclear stockpile and plans to reach 180 nuclear weapons by the mid-2020s, which will represent a 65% reduction since the height of the Cold War. The British government's standard practice is to have one submarine on deterrent patrol at any given time, though it claims the missiles are not on alert and would take several days of preparation before launching.

The British nuclear deterrent is currently assigned to NATO and its primary function is to contribute to the Alliance's defence. [At the 74th session of the DISEC Committee held on 30th of October 2019](#), the UK's delegate declared that his country supports the creation of such a zone

in the Middle East only on the condition that all regional states pursue an inclusive, cooperative and consensus-based negotiation that considers their respective security concerns.

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

As of early 2019, Russia's nuclear arsenal is estimated to comprise 6,490 warheads, including approximately 2,000 that have been retired and are awaiting dismantlement. At the 1995 NPT Review Conference, the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia introduced a resolution, agreed upon by all NPT parties, endorsing a NWFZ in the Middle East.

Despite having voted against each other's proposals on the topic at hand a few times, all the P5 countries have a similar view on the proposal of a nuclear-weapons-free Middle East as they all seek stability in the region. However, the Russian Federation is usually on opposite sides to France, the UK and the USA in regards to the actual conflicts in the Middle East, which might create some difficulties in finding common ground.

The main difference, however, is Moscow's allies in the Middle East. While not having many of them, the Russian Federation is an economic supporter of Iran and has helped Teheran by increasing the trade between Moscow and Teheran by 17% over the last year. By easing the economic sanctions placed on Iran, Russia proves the strong ties between the two nations.

THE UNITED STATES

The US has a totally different view in regards to Iran. The United States has had a trade war with Iran since 1995 when any trade with Iran was suspended. In May 2018 Donald Trump announced that the United States will be redrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The president of the United States has called the JCPOA "Obama's bad deal with Iran" and has repeatedly stated that Iran does not stick with their part of the deal. Trump feared that Iran will be able to produce nuclear weapons in the near future and that the lifted economic sanctions would only facilitate that process.

However, there are allegations that the United States withdrew from the JCPOA because the Israeli officials were not pleased with the reached agreement. The US delegate has declared on 30 October that his country will support the NWFZ only if all states were to agree upon an

implementation plan. Otherwise, in the absence of the participation of all regional States, he added, Washington, D.C., will not attend the conference and it will view any outcome as illegitimate.

IRAN

Iran is believed not to fully respect the terms of the JCPOA. The Iranian response is that peace and security should only be achieved by the countries in the Middle East and condemns the US' intervention and "economic terrorism". Notably, President Trump did not claim that Iran had violated any specific terms of the agreement. Iran has expressed a willingness to remain in the JCPOA despite the U.S. withdrawal, and all other P5+1 states reiterated their commitment to full implementation of the deal.

Moreover, Teheran is also suspected of providing military and financial for various terrorist groups in different Middle East countries such as ISIS, Hezbollah and the Houthi insurgency. The possibility of Iran having nuclear weapons is even more to be worried as there are plenty of conflicts that could be escalating.

The Israeli-Iranian relationship is another impediment in the way of reaching peace and stability in the region. Having a long history of reciprocal hate, Iran is among the few nations that voted against Israel's admission to the United Nations. In the current times, the anti-Israel rhetoric of the Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and his desire for "the regime occupying Jerusalem" to "vanish from the pages of time," has led many Israelis to fear an eventual attack from Iran.

Iran and Israel have also denied signing some resolutions that facilitated the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East, always using as justification the unfair US sanctions that crippled their economy. Teheran is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and is actively working to acquire, develop, and deploy a broad range of ballistic missiles and space launch capabilities. The scope and status of Iran's chemical and biological activities are unknown, but the most recent Western intelligence estimates have downgraded the likelihood that Iran maintains significant offensive chemical and biological weapons programs.

ISRAEL

Israel is known for “deliberate ambiguity” when it comes to having Weapons of Mass Destruction programs, neither confirming nor denying it. Over the years, officials repeated that "Israel will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East".

Israel has a record of non-compliance with arms control and non-proliferation treaties as Tel Aviv refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In fact, Israel is the only Middle East country not to sign the NPT as it is "against the national security interest".

Israel's vision in regards to the conflicts in the Middle East is pretty clear. Tel Aviv is threatened by another proxy war with Iran as they claim that Teheran has been aiding economically and militarily a terrorist group in Lebanon called Hezbollah.

Having limited military resources and being geographically and population-wise limited, Israel sees their denial to sign the NPT as a way to highlight its important role to the other Middle East states. Therefore, Israel believes that the stability in the region is a precondition to the nuclear disarming.

Moreso, the Israelis opposed the JCPOA because lifted sanctions means for Iran more funds available to finance terrorist groups, which the polar opposite of what Israel believes should be the start of a Middle East which lacks nuclear weapons.

Points to be addressed

1. Is it important that all member states sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty?
2. Should the NPT be legally enforced? If so, by whom?
3. Who is at fault for not having a NWFZ already in the region?
4. Is nuclear power a solution for combating pollution? If so, is combating pollution a strong enough argument in order to face the risks of nuclear plants?
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using nuclear power?
6. What are the dangers of using nuclear power plants and what specific measures are needed to be taken in order to prevent any nuclear disasters?
7. Should any state develop nuclear weapons, even though they are used only for defence?

8. If not, how could the international community make sure that no state uses their nuclear power plants in order to produce nuclear weapons instead of using them in order to fulfil the energy demand?
9. Will the creation of nuclear power plants create a snowball effect that would further increase tensions in the area?
10. How would the Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) map specifically look like?
11. How can we assure the continuity and sustainability of the Weapon Free Zone?
12. How would a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone be beneficial to the region?

Further reading

<https://www.armscontrol.org/print/4705>

<https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/mewmdfz>

<https://studylib.net/doc/5507235/nato>

<https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-on-the-prohibition-of-nuclear-weapons/>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Disarmament_of_Libya

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Opera

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Outside_the_Box

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iu4adTKvdFU>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zZUMoEfTr7w>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poPLSgbSO6k&t=401s>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons

<https://www.nti.org/about/global-nuclear-policy/>

<https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties/>

<https://youtu.be/sVhLOzV>

<https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-208143/>

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gadis3640.doc.htm>

<https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gadis3637.doc.htm>

<https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/>

<https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/israel/>

Relevant documents

Non-Proliferation Treaty:

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text/>

UNSC Resolution 687, especially paragraph 14

<https://www.un.org/Depts/unmovic/documents/687.pdf>

The NPT Review Conference 1995:

<https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt1995/>

The NPT Review Conference 2010 and 2015:

<https://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2015/>